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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IN CONTEXT 
Thomas S. Eberle 
Soziologisches Seminar der Hochschule St. Gallen 
Switzerland 
The SocialConstruction ofReality by Berger and Luckmann 
is one of the most cited sociological books of the past twenty- 
five years. Its title is, undoubtedly, one of their outstanding 
achievements. Its contents, however, while brilliantlywritten, 
have possibly never been really understood. Some have said, 
rather maliciously, that the book sold so well because many 
engineers (mistakenly) bought it. Unfortunately, I may add, 
of the many sociologists who bought or cited the book only a 
few have studied it. 
The bookwas published in German at S.Fischer in 1970, 
opening the new series "Conditio Humana," and was 
introduced by the great Helmuth Plessner. Interestingly 
enough, it was not reviewed by the renownedKOlnerZeitschrifr 
fir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Otherwise it was well 
received. Book reviewers commended the new, non- 
ideological approach, praised the low price, and expressed 
amazement that an American original was published in 
German within only three (actually four) years. Although the 
sociology of knowledge used to be a pet theme of German 
readers (as Plessner notes in the introduction), Social 
Construction did not have an easy time of it. When structural 
functionalismand quantitativesociology--bothimported from 
the United States after World War 11--confronted growing 
criticism in the sixties, theFrankfurt school and neo-Maxxism 
reaped the benefit. Then, after Habermas entered into awell- 
publicized debate with Niklas Luhmann (who defended a 
functionalist systems theory blending Parsonian and 
phenomenological concepts), the two became the most cited 
and quoted German sociologists of the period. 
Nonetheless, a growing group of sociologists sought a 
closer and more adequate approach to social reality than 
these highly-abstract general theories allowed. To these 
people, Social Construction beckoned the way to symbolic 
interactionism, ethnomethodology, socio-linguistics, and 
other facets of the "interpretive paradigm." This is how I 
came to study these approaches as a graduate student in the 
early seventies. 
What struck me most were the theses that reality is 
socially constructed and that sociology has to study the ways 
in which this is done. The book resurrected Alfred Schutz' 
phenomenological analysis of the life-world, used it to clarify 
basic sociological concepts like role and institution, and 
offered a new synthesis not only of Weber and Durkheim, but 
also of Mead and philosophical anthropology (Gehlen and 
Plessner). Berger and Luckmann's explication of the media 
through which social order is objectified--typification, signs, 
symbols, habitualization, and so on--rendered deep insights 
into the richness of human interaction. Their analysis of the 
relationship between social institutions and the symbolic 
worlds of meaning (Sinnwelten) which legitimize them proved 
once and for all that conventional sociological jargon about 
the "logic of institutions" obscured the actual processes 
through which institutions become social realities. They 
presented a sociological theory which conceived of social 
actors as competent humans, evaded sociological reifications, 
and abjured the widespread arrogance of social scientists 
(who at the time loved to talk of "false consciousness" and 
Freudian "unconscious constraints," properly identified, of 
course, by themselves). But above all, they made clear how 
naivean objectivist stance towards social reality is. Putsimply: 
The how of social phenomena has to be explicated before we 
can attend to the what and the why, 
Undoubtedly, the book had its shortcomings. The main 
one, in my view, was the exclusion of epistemological and 
methodological discussions (which tactically, I admit, may 
have been a good move). Why should sociologists care about 
subjective meaning, given their concern with social actions 
and social facts? For sake of reliability, should they not limit 
themselves to external, observable behavior? Schutz agreed 
that methodological considerations limit the extent and ways 
in which sociologists can explore subjective experience. 
Sociological and phenomenological analyses have different 
purposes even when they focus on the same phenomenon. In 
Structures of the Life- WorM, Schutz and Luckmann offer fine- 
grained descriptions of the formal meaning structures of 
everyday life. Phenomenologists trust that these structures 
can be explicated by the reflexive analyses of intentionality. 
Phenomenological analysis, however, is proto-socwlogical. 
Thus a division of labor is struck: The meaning structures of 
the life-world form, on an epistemological level, a frame in 
which the hemzeneutic task of sociological analysis inevitably 
has to be pursued. How interpretation is conducted is indeed 
a methodological question within the finite province of 
meaning of sociology. But the sociological preoccupation 
with sociality, understanding and intention a&es not from a 
preference of one "method" over another, but from the 
intersubjective nature of the lifeworld itself. 
Seen from Europe, the portrait of "phenomenological 
sociology" in American textbooks was often crude caricature. 
The twenty-fifth anniversary of Social Consmrction provides 
the opportunity to redress this impression. If the arguments 
in thebooksometimes seem to bewritten alittle too elegantly, 
and ifyou are bothered by the loose definition ofsome central 
concepts, you can find detailed specifications in Smctures of 
the Life- WorM. Even if you are skeptical about the possibility 
of phenomenological analysis, you will not find another book 
which explicates human experience, knowledge and action, 
and the interrelatedness of subjective and intersubjective 
knowledge in richer detail. If you consider that a discipline 
likecognitive anthropologymovedfrom the linguisticanalysis 
of terms to the investigation of idioms and is now slowly 
arriving at the notion of cultural knowledge and its complex 
relation to action, you recognize how far ahead Berger and 
Luckmann were twenty-five years ago. 
What are the prospects for a phenomenologically oriented 
sociology in Germany today? It is evident that phenomenology 
has vastly spread in the past two decades. Phenomenological 
concepts are found throughout the different fields ofsociology. 
The grand theorists Habermas and Luhmann have 
incorporated phenomenologicalconcepts as centralelements. 
German rational choice theorists are attempting to integrate 
Schutz' work on "choosing among projects of action" into 
their approach as well (e.g. Hartmut Esser).l As for the 
institutionalization of phenomenology, two facts are worth 
noting: The German Research Foundation recently acquired 
Schutz'private libraryfor theschutz Archiveattheuniversity 
of Constance, and the prestigious publisher Suhrkamp at 
Frankfurt is planning a new, all-inclusive edition of Schutz' 
writings. 
Finally, a lively research tradition is under way. A group 
of phenomenologically oriented sociologists, favoring 
empirical analyses of concrete social interaction, publishes 
regularly at prominent publishers (Suhrkamp, Fink). In 
analyzing what Berger and Luckmann called the 
"conversational apparatus" in which a common sense of 
reality is constructed as an ongoing accomplishment in face- 
to-facesituations, they borrowwidely from ethnomethodology, 
ethnography, conversation analysis, symbolicinteractionism, 
cognitive anthropology, and other specialties. By investigating 
the processes of reality construction locally and in situ, they 
complement the general level of analysis insocial Construction 
and materialize what had been Berger and Luckmann's goal 
from theoutset: to foundan empirical sociologyof knowledge. 
Endnote 
Hartmut Esser's essay, "The RationaIityof EverydayBehavior: AIRational 
Choice' Reconstructionof theTheoryofAction ofAlfredSchOtz,"will appear 
in the October issue ofRationality and Society -ed. 
RECONSTRUCTION INSTEAD OF 
CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE SOCL4L 
, CONSTRUCTION OF REILZTY' 
Hans-Georg Soeffner 
FernUniversitiit GHS 
Translated by Mara Luckmann 
It would "certainlynot amount to thesame thing" had the 
authors called their book "The Construction of Social Reality" 
instead of The Social Construction of Reality. Thus begins 
Helmuth Plessner's introduction to the German edition 
published in 1970. This comment may bear even greater 
importance today than it did twenty-five years ago. 
Then the Parsonians were adjudicating the theoretical 
debates, while empirical social research, in the guise of 
mathematized scholasticism, was waxing enthusiastic over 
ever more artful statistical models. At the same time, in 
almost all 'western' industrial countries, old social utopias 
had formed an alliance with a new search for collectively- 
binding meaning. Some younger (as well as a few older) 
sociologists submerged themselves in the new movements. A 
new pillar-of-fire sociology came into being which attempted 
to show the nations in the desert the true path. And it tried to 
protect itself from error by acquiring the label 'critical.' For 
sociology, it was a restless but nonetheless fertile period i ~ ?  
which new and old currents met. 
[Soeffner recounts the state of academic sociology in 
West Germany from WWII to the 1%0s, mentioning the 
reverse emigration of Adorno, Horkheimer and Bloch, the 
debate between Habermas and Popper, and the belated 
rediscovery ofNorbert Elias. He traces Bergerand Luckmann's 
conception of a sociologv of knowledge "cleansed of all 
ideological baggage" back to Weber's verstehende soziologie 
and Schutz' analyses of intersubjectivity, symbol, sign, and 
life-world.] 
What these analyses revealed was the 'relative-natural 
world view' (Scheler) which constitutes our everyday reality, 
on whose seemingly secure foundation our everyday actions 
occur in a meaningful, but also pre-theoretical way. The 
ultimate target ofthis search for the'foundationsofknowledge 
in everyday life' was the central object of the social sciences: 
the constitution ofwhat we call 'the societa1,'its phenomena, 
its structural forms, and its processes of 'implementation' and 
articulation. 
[While Schutz had already assimilated the pragmatist 
ideas of multiple realities (James) and the multiplicity of 
perspectives (Dewey, Mead) into his "proto-sociology," 
Berger and Luckmann transferred this whole project into the 
sociology of knowledge, giving the theory of institutions a 
micro-foundation in the process.] The result: a sociology of 
knowledge from the perspective of constitution-analysis. 
This sociology describes the human way of approaching 
the world, the genesis and transmission as well as the changes 
in our knowledge of the world from the perspective of 
subjectivity. It describes the formation of the social 'identity 
of individuals' within the framework of an imposed 
'societization' and a socio-historical apriority. Above all, the 
intention is to show how our everyday reality and our everyday 
actions are determined by institutions, products, worldviews, 
collective 'mentalities,' behavior patterns, and forms of 
knowledge. All of these arise from human action, and in turn 
have a retroactive effect upon human action. 
The analysis regards itself as the reconstruction of the 
social construction of reality. It shows how social worlds are 
created by their denizens, and the conditions social worlds 
impose upon them in turn. It is neither the reproduction of a 
system which processes new 'inputs' according to old- 
established patterns, nor ademonstrationofhowthecountless 
cogwheels of a social mechanism intersect. Instead, we are 
shown how societies produce what they claim to know and 
thus the 'worlds' they inhabit. Thus equipped, we may turn to 
the concrete historicmaterials and forms without speculative 
filter. 
Applying such a method of constitution-analysis is like 
applying a laxative to all forms of speculation or prophecy. In 
this respect, Social Construction is a disappointment, in spite 
of its irrefutable success, to all those who expect sociology to 
present cosmic blueprints or a 'world-theory' (Luhmann). 
For it leaves no room for a sociology that provides meaning 
nor yet for its twin, a sociology that unmasks meaning. The 
aim is simply the reconstruction of social constructions--the 
description, interpretation, and understanding of 
understanding itself in a world which always comes to us pre- 
interpreted. 
[For a contemporary example of the quest for 
metaphysical truths insociology, Soeffner cites "therecently- 
formed love match" between Niklas Luhrnann's systems theory 
and "radical constructionism," while partially exempting 
Karin Knorr-Cetina's "solid empirical reconstructions of 
constructions."] This colorful congregation meets under the 
sign of the trinity of 'system, construction, and auto-poiesis' 
--a unity which can only be held together with the greatest of 
